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Introduction
This article examines how the events surrounding the Iranian Revolution, namely the fall of the
Shah, the hostage crisis, and the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s, contributed to the formation of a U.S.Saudi transnational capitalist investment bloc in U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf. Theorized
by Koruzhde and Cox (2022), the transnational investment bloc refers to a cross-border coalition
between transnational investors in the U.S. and the Persian Gulf that formed during the late 1970s
and early 1980s. Specifically, this coalition included U.S. business transnationalists with
investments in the Persian Gulf and the U.S. military-industrial complex (MIC), deeply embedded
in U.S. foreign policy bureaucracy, on one side, and state-business elites in the oil-rich countries
of the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, on the other.1 I show how the developments in Iran
even before the revolution facilitated the consolidation of the transnational investment bloc by
accentuating the failure of détente and shifting the focus of the bloc toward great integration and
reliance on Saudi Arabia. This transnational investment bloc saw the Iranian Revolution of 1979
and its ramifications as a strategic and economic threat to their investments in the Persian Gulf.
The bloc then became the main advocate of American assertiveness and military preparedness in
the Persian Gulf and aggressively promoted anti-Iran and pro-Saudis policies.
This perceived threat that Iran posed to transnational investors was accentuated by a broader
context of the structural shifts in the global economy, U.S. militarization, the end of détente, and
the geostrategic and economic imperatives for U.S. policy as defined by an emerging transnational
investment bloc. The Iranian crisis was, as described by Don Oberdorfer of the Washington Post
(Klare 1980), “one of those rare international hinge events” that fueled the U.S. militarization of
the Persian Gulf. The aggressive Iran sanctions policies during the Carter and Reagan
administrations were adopted in large part to protect the interests of an emerging business-state
coalition whose militaristic tendencies reflected major changes in the U.S. business-state elite
structure. I examine the declassified documents from the meetings that National Security Council
(NSC) and its Special Coordination Committee (SCC) held in the wake of the hostage crisis to
show how the crisis contributed to shift in policy debate toward militarism, especially by changing
the perspective of figures like Brzezinski who was one of the founders of the Trilateral
Commission. 2
Transnational investors worked closely with U.S. policymakers in building cross-border alliances
with business and state leaders of the oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf and in incorporating
them within a U.S.-led neoliberal economic order. Of great importance to the consolidation of the
transnational investment bloc was the incorporation of Saudi Arabia that was facilitated by the
polices pursued by the Shah of Iran after the oil crisis of 1973 and his eventual collapse as a U.S.
ally in 1979. I document how Saudi Arabia played a key role in helping to stabilize the dollar and
oil prices in the 1970s, and to revive American foreign weapons sales that dramatically declined
with the loss of the Shah of Iran as a major customer of U.S. “arms supermarket.” The events
surrounding the Iranian Revolution helped the Saudis become an integral part of the transnational
investment bloc and expand their partnership over time. The Iran policy debates demonstrate the
The concept of the transnational investment bloc draws heavily on the “transnational interest bloc” theorized by
Ronald W. Cox (2019).
2
For an extensive account of the U.S. business-state elites’ role in the establishment of the Trilateral Commission see
(Sklar 1980).
1

ways that the transnational interest bloc consolidated around Saudi Arabia linkages due to the
Iranian crisis.
Overall, the foreign economic and political crises of the 1970s, culminating in the Iranian
Revolution, the hostage crisis, and the Iran-Iraq war, led to a more integrated transnational
capitalist interest bloc that became dominant in U.S. foreign policy toward the Persian Gulf in
general and Saudi Arabia and Iran in particular. Anti-Iran polices adopted in the Carter and later
in the Reagan administrations fit very well into the growing needs of the transnational investment
bloc that necessitated U.S. assertiveness and military protection in the volatile Persian Gulf region.
No account of U.S. Iran policy would be complete without locating it within the broader context
of the efforts of a U.S. state-corporate transnational bloc to uphold the American neoliberal
hegemony.
In the next two sections I examine two major ways in which the developments in Iran surrounding
the revolution contributed to the formation of the transnational investment bloc: first, I discuss
how these developments accelerated the breakdown of liberal internationalism represented by
détente that was instigated by dramatic changes in the structure of the global economy. Which it
then helped the transnational investors to find their interests in the Persian Gulf aligned with that
of the MIC [that was opposing détente since its beginning] and join them to promote U.S. military
expansion in the region; second, I analyze how the revolution took away from the U.S. the Shah
of Iran as an ally and led the U.S. to replace him with the Saudis. The role that the Saudis came to
play in stabilizing the U.S. and the global energy and financial markets as well as in making
continuous purchases from the U.S. arms supermarket poised them well to become an integral part
of the transnational investment bloc. In the final section, I will document how U.S. business-state
elites, embedded within the U.S. foreign policy decision-making and prestigious think-tanks, used
the Iranian crisis to thicken energy, financial, and military ties to the Persian Gulf. This marked
the beginning of the dominance of an oil-finance-military complex in U.S. policy toward the
Persian Gulf, particularly toward Saudi Arabia and Iran.

The Iranian Crisis and the End of Détente
In the late 1960s, the U.S.-Soviet relationship entered an era of decreased tension known as
détente. U.S. detente with the Soviet Union resulted in a ratified and implemented SALT I and a
negotiated SALT II.3 This era presented the U.S. business community with the prospect of
increased trade and investment opportunities. The main supporters of détente were a coalition of
corporate internationalists consisting of internationally oriented businesses like commercial and
investment bankers, capital-intensive manufacturers, and transnational oil companies. This liberal
internationalist bloc was heavily represented by a corporate elite network consisting of Business
Roundtable,4 Council on Foreign Relations, and most importantly the Trilateral Commission that
can be understood “as the ideological perspective representing the transnational outlook of the
multinational corporation [which] seeks to subordinate territorial politics to non-territorial
economic goals” (Falk 1975, 1005).

3
4

Before the latter was scrapped due to international and domestic factors.
Described by Business Week as “the most powerful voice of business.” Quoted in (Saloma 1984, 66).

The U.S. faced international political and economic crises in the 1970s and the early 1980s which
led to the breakdown of liberal internationalism, the end of détente, and the resurgence of
militarism in U.S. foreign policy. The demise of the Bretton Woods System, the increased
international competition, the 1973 oil price hikes, the 1973-1975 “Great Recession,” the overall
decline of profit rates, and the fact that trade and investment agreements with the Soviet bloc had
lost momentum, all brought about a structural shift in the global economy. Moreover, by the late
1970s, business internationalists as the main supporters of détente were becoming more
transnational in their financial and production structures.5 The Third World countries were
profitable destination for the transnational capital as they offered cheaper labor as well as brighter
trade, investment, and loan prospects. The Third World however suffered from social and political
turmoil that was a threat to the profitability of the transnational capital. The Iranian revolution of
1979 as well as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan embodied that threat as they came to destabilize
the Persian Gulf that was the backbone of the entire oil/dollar-based structure of the world
economy.
The Iranian crisis in particular accentuated the fraying of the détente coalition and legitimized the
long-standing critique of détente that had already been developed by the U.S. military-industrial
complex (MIC) from the beginning of this policy. The revolution and the hostage crisis sent a
unifying message to the American elite structure, as Bacevich (2008, 38) puts it: “Here was
unmistakable evidence of what happened when the United States hesitated to assert itself in this
part of the world.” Just like the message, the lesson was clear too: “If developments in the Persian
Gulf could adversely affect the American standard of living, then control of that region by anyone
other than the United States had become intolerable.” Following these crises, the corporate
coalition of liberal internationalists fell apart and abandoned détente as the predominant U.S.
foreign policy characterization in favor of a more militarized and confrontational approach. Seeing
détente as inadequate in protecting their interests, liberal internationalists distanced themselves
from liberal political supporters of the Carter administration, particularly on U.S. Third World
policies and the military posture.6 They started to see confrontational measures like sanctions and
military force and preparedness as a necessary element in fending off the challenges posed by the
increasing internationalization of the economy, oil price shocks, the growing turmoil in Third
World, and the declining competitiveness of U.S. firms vis-à-vis the German and Japanese
economies (Ansell 1996, 61).7
By the late 1970s, the important segments of the business internationalists, led by prominent U.S.
banks, deeply embedded in U.S. decision-making and corporate-backed think-tanks,8 urged the
U.S. government to develop global and regional policies designed to preserve access to foreign
markets as well as to protect capital investment and profit margins from the turmoil in the Third
These economic shifts, as Peschek (1987, 141) puts it, “had two results that fed into resurgent militarism: the costs
of disrupting U.S.-Soviet relations were lowered, and the enhancement of military intervention capabilities seemed
necessary to protect economic interests, given the politically explosive effects of uneven capitalist development in the
Third World periphery. The heightened rivalry of advanced capitalist powers in the late 1970s…also encouraged the
belief that military strength might spell political leverage.”
6
The coalition that supported Carter’s foreign policies, comprised of multi-national corporate interests and liberal
political groups, was already divided. For more on the rifts in this coalition on one hand and unity and organization in
the conservative front on the other see (Skidmore 1996, 120-125).
7
This is why Cox (1998) calls them “aggressive internationalists.”
8
Such as Trilateral Commission, Business Roundtable, Brooking Institute, and Council on Foreign Relations.
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World, especially in highly unstable regions like the Persian Gulf.9 They also ended up supporting
aggressive policies toward Iran even before 1979, due to concerns about the threatening and
negative impact of Iran’s policies on their global financial investments. For the transnational
investors, a show of strength through military projection and assertiveness was necessary to
facilitate the ongoing needs of an increasingly transnational investment bloc.10 Use of force, be it
military intervention or economic warfare, became predominant means of dealing with the political
and economic instability of the Persian Gulf that threatened access of transnational capital to oil
supplies and potentially drove countries away from a U.S.-backed global order.11 So, by the early
1980s, these sectors of transnational capital found their interests aligned with the business sectors
associated with the MIC and joined them in their efforts [that had started since the late 1960s] to
push U.S. foreign policy more toward militarism, 12 providing a broader emphasis toward a more
consolidated "right turn"13 among economically powerful sectors and marking the beginning
stages of the formation of the transnational investment bloc.14
Together, these sectors established an oil-finance-military complex that worked closely with U.S.
policymakers to identify U.S. military expansion and economic entanglement in the Persian Gulf
region as central to U.S. national security, calling for higher military spending and militarization
in general, including use of military and economic force. The developments in Iran validated the
increasing concerns of this complex that was growing power in U.S. Persian Gulf policy, especially
in the context of the purported diminishing U.S. military and economic superiority in the 1970s.
Following the Iranian crisis, this coalition pushed the Carter administration away from its Trilateral
principles- hinging on anti-military posture, multilateralism, and reliance on U.S. European allies
and the Japanese- and more towards rearming and toughening American posture that the
opposition had been advocating since the early 1970s. Creating an atmosphere where only
assertive measures were considered patriotic, the hostage crisis contributed significantly and
directly to abandoning détente and supporting militarization.
The perceived threat the new regime in Iran posed to the stability of the Persian Gulf further
consolidated the transnational investment bloc by institutionalizing U.S. military expansion in the
region through the Carter Doctrine announced in January of 1980. The transnational investment
bloc had several motivations to support anti-Iran policies and to manufacture an image of Iran as
a major threat to U.S. “national security” over time. Knowing these motivations, we can connect
the interests of the bloc to the Iranian threat definition by the end of the 1970s and throughout later
decades. Ever since its establishment, the Iranian government has been regarded as the greatest
9

For more on the strategic planning of the transnational corporations see (Haendel 1981, chap. 1). For an analysis of
the interventionist tendencies of corporations with large investments see (Cox 1998, Frieden 1989, Ansell 1996).
10
For more on the strategic planning of the transnational corporations see (Haendel 1981, chap. 1).
11
By the time, the Persian Gulf region covered 34 percent of U.S. petroleum imports.
12
The MIC mobilized in the late 1960s and early 1970s in response to the decline in military expenditure and overseas
arms sales that resulted from détente. The major military companies, manufacturers of basic weaponry components,
and mining companies, among others who were ideologically tied to the far right, all had vested interest in increasing
U.S. military adventure in the Persian Gulf.
13
For an extensive analysis of the business mobilization that led to this shift in U.S. foreign policy by the late 1970s
see (Ansell 1996) and (Skidmore 1996).
14
This was not the first time that mutual interest drove these two camps with different sectoral interest into a coalition.
Back in the mid-1960s, when the Vietnam War offered dividends to both groups, they built a pro-Vietnam coalition
to support Johnson’s Vietnam policies. For more on this subject see (Devereux 1996). Also, see Cox (1998) on the
role of this coalition in bringing about the “right turn” in U.S. foreign policy.

challenge to the U.S.-led petrodollar structure (Wight 2021, 280) that tied the transnational
investment bloc to the Persian Gulf.15 In this system, the oil-rich Arab countries of the Persian
Gulf, led by Saudi Arabi, started to recycle their vast surpluses that resulted from massive oil
revenues in the 1970s in major U.S. banks, invest in U.S. Treasury bonds and finance U.S. debt,
and buy advanced weapons from U.S. top military firms. In the wake of the revolution, the Iranian
government formed a militant Shia to challenge the Sunni Arab governments of the region,
particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Through the Quds Force as its lead agency for military
operations, the Iranian government has engaged in a constant proxy war in the region for the last
four decades.16 Iranians’ sabotaging and destabilizing capabilities in the region have had the U.S.GCC investment coalition believe that their investments and petrodollar ties would be protected
from the Iranian threat only through a more pronounced U.S. military intervention in the region.
One of the main reasons why Iran sanctions policies have expanded over the past four decades,
regardless of the different administrations in office, is the promotion of this policy by this capitalist
interest bloc. There are several logics behind their support of Iran sanctions. First, a sanction-free
Iran was portrayed as more capable of financing the militias that operate against Americans, Arabs,
and Israelis in the region. These militia groups were thought to pose a threat to the major
investments of U.S.-based sectors of transnational capital that have been partnering with the
Persian Gulf countries in multi-billion-dollar projects, both in the Persian Gulf and in the U.S.
Second, sanctions were expected to help reduce the Iranian threat to the major U.S.
business/security allies in the Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Israel. Third, an
isolated Iran would be less of a peril to the stability of the oil flow which is tantamount with the
flow of petrodollars from the region into the U.S. banks as well as the global capital market. U.S.
strategists and business leaders are aware that the steady access to the Persian Gulf’s oil and the
stability of the prices are extremely vital to the entire capitalist system which is inextricably
intertwined with the U.S. strategic planning (Stokes and Raphael 2010, chapter one). Fourth,
economic warfare would reinforce Iran’s hostility toward the U.S. and its Arab and Israeli allies
in the region. This promotion of what I call “tension politics” leads to continuous arms transfer to
the region, benefiting the U.S. arms industry that has been a key component of the transnational
investment bloc since its formation. And fifth, sanctions are assumed to instigate domestic
opposition that would eventually remove the ruling Mullahs and put in power a government more
friendly toward neoliberal principles. Transnational capitalists preferred a neoliberal government
in Iran that could generate significant profits for foreign investors. Profit-making activities in Iran
would be especially attractive in the energy sector. This last motivation is pretty evident in Dick
Cheney’s account of the U.S. strategic economic interests when he was out of office and became
the CEO of one of the largest oil service companies in the world.17
In sum, the loss of Iran as an ally due to the revolution, and the hostage crisis following it,
corroborate the claims of the critics of the Carter administration that détente could no longer serve
U.S. “national interests.” The main supporters of this view in the U.S. business community were
the business sectors associated with the MIC that opposed détente all along. In the early 1980s,
they were joined in their efforts to push U.S. foreign policy further to the right by corporate
15

For a detailed examination of U.S.-Saudi petrodollar ties embedded in the transnational investment bloc see
(Koruzhde and Cox 2022).
16
For a detailed discussion on the Quds Force’s role in the Iranian way of war in the region see (Uskowi 2019).
17
For more on this point see (Anthony 2008/July30, 20-21).

internationalists that abandoned détente after the structural shifts in the global economy and
foreign policy crises in Iran and Afghanistan that were perceived to pose serious threat to their
investment and trade opportunities in the Persian Gulf. This emerged coalition marked the very
early stages of the formation of a transnational investment bloc in U.S. policy toward the Persian
Gulf that is deeply embedded in U.S. foreign policy decision-making and corporate elite networks.
This bloc aggressively promoted anti-Iran polices in the wake of the revolution and has
dramatically expanded its campaign against Iran over the decades.

Iran’s Contribution to the Saudis Integration into the Transnational Investment Bloc
As a cross-border coalition, the transnational investment bloc thrives on U.S.-Saudi petrodollar
structure that rests on the stability of oil prices, the dollar, and weapon sales to Saudi Arabia. The
developments in Iran before and after the revolution led to the incorporation of Saudi Arabia as
the key element of the transnational investment bloc. The massive oil revenues of the 1970s
convinced the Shah of Iran that in order to cover the expenses of the military buildup and the
expensive social and economic programs he had embarked upon, the price of oil should stay high
and even go higher. Gradually U.S. leaders realized that the Shah was very ardent in pushing for
higher prices, thus becoming a threat to the oil-based American way of life.18 They then tilted
toward the Saudis to encourage them to use their leverage in OPEC to secure production targets
that would help stabilize the price of oil, as well as to help ensure that the West would have ongoing
access to Persian Gulf oil (Cooper 2008, Wong 2016, Gibbs 2021). When approached by Simon
in 1976, the Saudis agreed to undercut the price of oil and boost production to flood the market.
Therefore, at the December 1976 OPEC summit in Doha, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, in collusion with
the U.S., decided to force down the price of oil to guarantee the stability of oil markets. 19 The
Iranian revolution resulted in even more reliance on Saudis’ contribution to the stability of the oil
markets. For the revolution brought the oil markets to the verge of a shock due to the loss of Iran’s
oil production, and it was Saudi Arabia that came to the rescue and covered Iran’s share of
production.
Given the intertwined links between oil and the dollar, Saudi Arabia assumed an even more crucial
role in the health of the U.S. economy. Saudis’ role in stabilizing the dollar began in July 1974,
when Secretary of Treasury William Simon, a high-profile Wall Street investor,20 traveled to Jedda
to negotiate an agreement whereby the Saudis agreed to sell their oil in dollar and invest (“recycle”)
their vast surpluses into U.S. Treasury bonds, explicitly financing the U.S. debt.21 Saudi Arabia
would also use its clout with the smaller Gulf states, so that they would do the same with their

18

As Bacevich points out, the U.S. officials could not tolerate such measures because the oil shock of 1973 and the
oil price spike had already shown the “clearest and most painful affirmation of [Americans’] sudden economic
vulnerability” (Bacevich 2008, 30).
19
The decision “rushed the Iranian economy to the precipice,” destabilized its economy and cost the Shah his hold on
to power (Cooper 2008, 589).
20
For more on business affiliations of William Simon see (Stevenson 2000).
21
There are strong ties between the Treasury Department and Saudis. Treasury secretary John B Connally before
Simon had irrefutable ties to Saudi and Arab interests. See (Doran 2012, 290).

petrodollar surpluses.22 These moves in turn sent a signal to central banks and private financial
interests around the world that the U.S. debt was a worthwhile place to park surplus capital,
drawing in vast resources, enabling the U.S. to remain a debtor nation – with no penalty of needed
austerity. It is worth mentioning that the Saudis were very emphatic as to keeping the purchase of
U.S. debt “strictly secret.” For more details on the importance of the Saudis petrodollars to U.S.
financial system see (Wong 2016). While Saudi Arabia was becoming a more prominent actor in
U.S. debt market, the Shah was losing his position as his lavish programs did not allow him to
contribute as much to recycling Iran’s petrodollars. Figure 1 displays how the two countries went
in different directions in financing U.S. debt, thus stabilizing the dollar.

Figure 1: U.S. Treasury debt to oil-exporting countries; Iran and Saudi Arabia (billion dollars)
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Source: U.S. Department of Treasury, Federal Reserve Board (2016)

Last but not least, the Iranian revolution facilitated the Saudis incorporation into the transnational
investment bloc by positioning Saudi Arabia in Iran’s place as the major customer of U.S. foreign
weapon sales. The Shah’s collapse ended the U.S. “surrogate strategy” and with it the massive
arms sales programs to Iran. For nearly a decade the U.S. opened its “arms supermarket” (Klare
1984) to the Shah who intended to transform Iran into a major military power. During this period,
the Shah ordered over $20 billion worth of a rainbow of military hardware amounting to what one
U.S. lawmaker called “the most rapid military buildup of military power under peacetime
conditions of any nation in the history of the world” (Studds 1978). With his fall, the Shah took
away his portion of the U.S. arms sales abroad which amounted to 28 percent of all U.S. foreign
military sales program during that period and sent “shock waves” through the arms export
establishment. By the time of the revolution in Iran, the U.S. arms industry was left with an
estimated $8-$10 billion dollars’ worth of advanced weapons systems already under construction
22

These moves in turn sent a signal to central banks and private financial interests around the world that the U.S. debt
was a worthwhile place to park surplus capital, drawing in vast resources, enabling the U.S. to remain a debtor nation
– with no penalty of needed austerity. It is worth mentioning that the Saudis were very emphatic as to keeping the
purchase of U.S. debt “strictly secret.” For more details on the importance of the Saudis petrodollars to U.S. financial
system see (Wong 2016).

and a sudden liquidation of the Shah’s $15 billion shopping list. In fact, these problems produced,
to borrow from Michael Klare (1984, 134), “the greatest crisis in U.S. arms export policy since the
onset of the sales program in the early 1950.”
President Carter ordered Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to overcome the crisis very
expediently and dispose of all the equipment ordered by the Shah but not produced or delivered
yet. Brown’s first stop was Riyadh. He offered a comprehensive program to the Saudis which
would alter the arms transfer paradigm in U.S.-Saudi relationship. The program essentially aimed
to substitute Iran with Saudi Arabia and transfer some of the former’s “peacekeeping” functions
in the Persian Gulf to the latter in return for continuous arms and military assistance from the U.S.
The Saudis’ responsibility would not involve blocking the Soviet invasion but rather “combating
local insurgencies and tribal conflicts that could threaten the oil flow.” Frightened by the ripple
effects of the Iranian revolution throughout the Moslem world, Saudi Arabia wholeheartedly
embraced Brown’s proposal. Later they even agreed to finance the sales of advanced U.S. arms to
several neighboring countries including North Yemen and the Sudan (Klare 1984, 136-138). As is
evident today, the overthrow of the Shah as the major customer of American arms supermarket
entirely changed the U.S.-Saudis military relationship. Before 1978, the U.S. arms transfer to Saudi
Arabia not only was not significant, but it was viewed mostly as an isolated transaction rather than
part of a consolidated arms-supply relationship. After Brown’s trip to Saudi Arabia in 1979, U.S.
weapon sales to the Saudis became a constant in U.S.-Saudi relationship. U.S. top military
contractors are the major beneficiaries of this relationship, of course.
To sum up, the Iranian crisis prepared the ground for Saudi Arabia to become tied to an expanding
transnational investment bloc through its contribution to the stability of the oil and financial
markets, and to the flourishment of U.S. military firms. This role has only deepened and widened
throughout decades as more diverse sectors of transnational capital have been integrated to the
U.S.-Saudi capitalist bloc (Koruzhde and Cox 2022).

U.S. Business-State Elites, Iran Policy Debate, and Consolidation of the Transnational
Investment Bloc
The policy debates within the U.S. foreign policymaking structure demonstrates how the Iranian
crisis contributed to the consolidation of the transnational investment bloc through facilitating the
transition from global interdependence to global militarism and a pivot toward Saudi Arabia,
integrating it into a growing oil-finance-military complex. The loss of confidence in détente and
the signs of assertiveness were evident in the conclusion of the morning Special Coordination
Committee (SCC) meeting on November 6, two days after the hostage crisis broke out. 23 In this
meeting, a range of options was presented in case the hostages were killed, all of which points to
the change of attitude in U.S. foreign policy apparatus: “seizure of Iranian assets, cutoff of trade
(including food), and cessation of supply of spare parts for the military. Militarily, we could:
blockade Iran’s oil shipments; strike or seize a site such as the Bandar Abbas military base in the
south, Kharg Island oil loading terminal, or the three islands which Iran occupies at the mouth of
the Persian Gulf; we could attempt to destroy the F–14s and/or other military assets by air strike;
23

The main institution tasked with analyzing the situation and evaluating the U.S. response to the events in Iran was
the National Security Council (NSC) and its crisis management arm, Special Coordination Committee (SCC).

we would consider renewing direct support to the Kurds; and we could potentially kidnap a leading
Iranian figure as a counter-hostage” (SCC-d6 1979). Although Carter himself was more inclined
toward economic options, some key figures like Brzezinski and Admiral Turner, Director of the
CIA, were skeptical of them as the only measure. In the afternoon meeting SCC meeting on
November 6, Brzezinski supported more hawkish options from the list, especially in case the
hostages were killed.24 Supporting him, Admiral Turner weighed in by saying that “we really ought
to try to isolate Iran and blockade it.” Even some point even Carter agreed with this standpoint and
said: “we should insist that our European allies cooperate with us on an air blockade as well as
naval blockade. They might not agree but we should go to the mat on this one” (NSC-d8 1979).
The shift in the elite structure away from détente manifested most in Brzezinski’s arguments as to
how to cope with the Iranian crisis. One of the founders of the Trilateral Commission, Brzezinski
very soon realized that détente-driven policies against Iran could not help Carter in his reelection
campaign. He believed that some show of military strength could be of use for public appearance.
He cast doubt on the efficacy of what he called “litigational” approach and patience, arguing that
it would not fit U.S. triple goals of how to get the hostages back, how to get rid of Khomeini or
save Iran for the West, and how to get on with the Muslim world. Even if successful and the
hostages were released, he maintained, “we still run the risk of jeopardizing our electoral chances
if the public perceives us as having been intimidated in some fashion. From every public contact I
have had, I sense a strong desire for U.S. honor to be reasserted and for American power to be
demonstrated. Moreover, the Moslem world, and especially those Moslem states most dependent
on us, will become increasingly convinced that the United States can be coerced. This will make
our friends more insecure and our enemies more assertive, and thus it will also jeopardize goal #3
(a respectable relationship with the Arab world)” (Brzezinski-d80 Dec 4, 1979). Although the
blockade of Iranian port “would involve high risk,” he underscored, it not only would serve the
achievement of the mentioned goals but it also “be politically more appealing.” He emphasizes
that “[t]he public senses that our position is 100% correct on grounds of principle and that a strong
reaction is justified. It would support it…The application of military pressure, which involves very
high risks but which historically and politically is a preferable course to [endless litigation].
Moreover, the paradox of the situation is that increasingly evident willingness to use military
pressure may actually hasten a peaceful outcome, because it is likely to generate greater worldwide
desire for a rapid termination of the crisis” (Brzezinski-d61 Nov 1979).
Brzezinski advised Carter that if he thought time was not working in the U.S.’s favor, they would
need to combine financial sanctions (preferably coordinated with allies) with the threat “to proceed
with a direct unilateral blockade. “Alternatively,” Brzezinski emphasizes “we could begin to apply
such a blockade ourselves (by mining), and simply ask for allied support for that step, rather than
insist on an allied initiative in the economic area” (Brzezinski-d80 Dec 4, 1979). Earlier on
December 1, Secretary Brown had also advised the President to the same course of action. In a
memorandum he said: “I believe it will be time to push our Allies and friends to adopt some of the
strongest economic measures we can devise. Apparently, action by the European and Japanese
banks similar to our own—blocking, defaults, etc.—would soon have increasingly severe effects.
But those countries correctly view such action as risky and painful to themselves. They will take
it, if at all, only if they believe the alternative is military action by us that is even more risky to
24

A comprehensive list of options Brzezinski offered to the President to consider can be found here (Brzezinski-d71
Nov 29, 1979).

them in economic and political terms. We must be prepared to threaten such action…If we cannot
persuade them to take such economic and political action, or if it fails to secure release of the
hostages, we will have to consider military options very seriously… Mining is the mildest military
action I have found. We are seeking others, for example various acts to demonstrate how
we could damage Iran, but I doubt that we will come up with any that are effective without being
at the same time more escalatory” (Brown-d75 Dec 1, 1979).
Brzezinski believed that détente-oriented policies would be considered “soft” and would not serve
U.S. “national interests” in the long-term. If driven by détente he contended, the formulation of
Iran policy in the wake of the hostage crisis, could jeopardize America’s image and position among
its allies, particularly the Saudis, in the Persian Gulf. In a memorandum to President Carter, he
emphasized that “we need to look beyond the hostage issue in shaping our broad strategy”
(Brzezinski-d80 Dec 4, 1979). He pointed out that: “Recent attacks on our embassies, as well as
various Middle East press comments (encouraged probably by very subtle Soviet insinuations),
point in the direction of transforming the conflict into a wider assault on “corrupt and impotent”
America. This is a dangerous trend it could make. Perhaps I am wrong, but the issue is worth
examining because whatever answer you give should drive our strategy. (Right now it is being
driven by a diplomatic timetable.) My concern since a year ago has been that a regional crisis is
likely to develop as a result of the Shah’s fall. It could even become a global crisis.” He raised
his fear that “the emerging confrontation between Islam and the United States, accompanied by
European backsliding, could transform overall international and economic relations in a drastic
fashion.”
Of outmost importance was the U.S. posture in the Persian Gulf. Under a significant influence
from Brzezinski, the SCC also “recognized that the possibility of a U.S. evacuation cannot be
divorced from the larger question of U.S. strategic position in the region.” He believed that the
Iran events from February 1979 and the following hostage crisis had set the administration up to
define long-term U.S.-Persian Gulf relations. Unlike some of his colleagues (like Vence),
Brzezinski did not approve of evacuation of Americans from the region due especially to the
adverse effects it would have on U.S.-Saudi relationship. He noted in a November 29 SCC meeting
that “an evacuation could seriously destabilize the regime and undermine our strategic position in
the entire region. It would be a signal to the Saudis that the U.S. is disengaging from the region—
and that could have the gravest consequences for our vital interests. Accordingly, we should ask
the Saudis to assure the security of our people (and not talk of evacuation), and we should even
consider offering U.S. military assistance—including the 82nd Airborne if required—to insure the
security of the Eastern Province, if the Saudis would welcome it. This question will be reviewed
further after we hear Fahd’s response (Top Secret)” (SCC-d70 1979).
Brzezinski’s position vis-à-vis the Saudis and the Persian Gulf was supported by other key
members of the SCC who believed that a show of military strength was the answer to the Iranian
crisis in that it would save the Saudis for the U.S. Paul Henze of the NSC also believed that in
wake of the events in Iran, evacuating the Americans from the region may be the result of a
“bureaucratic panic.” In a memorandum to President Carter, he opined: “The more we reduce
presence in such countries, the less opportunity we have for communication with their
governments and peoples on any level and the more opportunities there will be for suspicions and
misunderstandings to grow. Rather than demonstrating to the world that we break and run when

under pressure, we would serve our own interests better if we displayed a stubborn insistence on
staying in place, asserting ourselves and being ready to fight (let the Marines shoot!) to defend our
installations and our principles when challenged. Eleven hundred Marines to protect more than
150 diplomatic installations around the world is too few. We need to double that number. We still
possess the most advanced technology in the world—we should announce a new program to apply
it to defense of our diplomatic establishments abroad” (Henze-d65 Nov 4, 1979). In a same line
of reasoning, General David Jones, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also espoused the
deployment of AWACS in Egypt. He believed U.S. should take whatever steps are possible to
expedite deployment of the AWACS in the event they should be needed. Gary Sick also, in a
memorandum to Brzezinski supported this view: “Our presence in the region is vital and effective.
We must know when and how we will be prepared to use it in order to respond promptly to events.
Non-violent shows of force, limited military actions, and rescue operations give us options to up
the ante or seize the initiative when conditions are ripe” (Sick-d78 Dec 3, 1979).
The insistence on U.S. presence in the region was accentuated by the fact that the loss of Iran’s oil
production following the Iranian crisis dramatically increased U.S. reliance on Saudi Arabia’s oil
production capacities. They thus used this dependence as a pretext to exaggerate the necessity of
U.S. military power projection in the Persian Gulf. In November 1979, Saudi Arabia proved again
to the U.S. elites that it was a reliable ally as it agreed to cover the loss of Iran’s oil production that
brought oil markets to the verge of collapse. After the crisis unfolded, officials from U.S.
Departments of Energy, State, Defense, and the National Security Council (NSC) immediately
convened to figure out a way to fend off the repercussions of an eventual oil embargo or reduced
production by Iran. According to the estimates of the Special Coordination Committee (SCC), in
case of a shutdown of Iranian supply, the effect would take several months to kick in but
nevertheless the consequences would be serious eventually. It was time U.S. policy makers tapped
into the bonds between the federal government and oil multinationals as a sturdy bridge between
the U.S. and oil-rich countries of the Persian Gulf. In their view, these corporations, particularly
Aramco, were an “appropriate conduit for trilateral diplomacy” (Bird 1980, 348). Therefore, the
SCC set out to “explore the possibility of arranging compensatory oil supplies from other oil
producers” and [through Duncan and Miller] “consult with the leaders of U.S. oil companies about
steps they could take to minimize the effects of any oil cutoff by Iran” (SCC-d6 1979). The U.S.
government expected that its close relationship with the transnational oil companies finally pay
off. In the November 6 meeting, Secretary Duncan mentioned that a “very high portion of
ARAMCO and other American companies’ oil was going to Europe since it was more profitable
there.” He opined that it was “an excellent idea to call in these companies and tell them that we
expect them to make up any shortfalls in our own production. We should see just how American
they really are.” Secretary Vance also believed that the U.S. could rely on Saudi Arabia. He echoed
Ambassador West’s confidence that “the Saudis would be pleased to make up any difference in
the event the Iranians should embargo us” (NSC-d8 1979).
The consolidation of the transnational investment bloc around Saudi linkages was also made
possible by a corporate-backed policy-planning network that gained more respect and privilege
during the Reagan administration.25 Heavily financed by the leading firms in the U.S. defense, oil,
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and banking sectors, this network ballooned the Iranian threat out of proportion and encouraged
the U.S. government to show its Saudi-led Arab allies in the region that their hopes lay with the
military support from the U.S., now that the new regime in Iran was a threat to their political
stability. An influential think-tank, the Heritage Foundation warned the Reagan administration that
“Iran would be encouraged to foment revolution in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf states.”
Sharing the Saudis’ concern about the threats that the Iran-Iraq posed to the stability of the region,
the Foundation recommends, in its Mandate for Leadership II, that U.S. should “take advantage
of the Iranian threat to other states of the region by improving U.S ties with them, particularly the
Arab states of the Persian Gulf” (Butler, Sanera and Weinrod 1984, 346-47). It also urges U.S.
officials to “maintain a fleet outside the Persian Gulf to protect shipping, to respond in local
emergencies,” and to counter potential Soviet and the Iranian threat. The Foundation aggressively
supported the reflagging of Kuwaiti oil tankers as a component of U.S.’s long-term efforts to
contain the destabilizing spillover effects of the Iranian revolution. These efforts, as the Foundation
suggested, revolved around fortifying military ties with the Saudis. That is why it encouraged the
sales of AWACS surveillance planes to Saudi Arabia. For it believed that the Iranian threat comes
less from its conventional capability and more from its asymmetrical warfare tactics. “American
AWACS surveillance planes provide early warning not only of missiles and aircraft but also of
Iranian speedboats” (Phillips July 20, 1987, 7).
As another “peddler of crisis,” the Committee on the Present Danger (CPD) took the most
advantage from the Iranian revolution, the hostage crisis, and the Iran-Iraq war to stabilize the
position of the transnational investment bloc within U.S. Persian Gulf policy, particularly within
U.S.-Saudi ties. The CPD pictured the Iranian crisis as part of the larger Soviet plot to control the
Persian Gulf and expand southward, thus assume more credibility for its military-oriented policy
guidelines. In its 1981 publication entitled The Security of the Persian Gulf, the CPD claims that
“Iran is a prime target of the Soviet Union in the latter’s southward course of expansion. For this
reason alone, the fate of Iran has to be an object of concern to the United States and her western
allies.” (CPD/92073 1981, 12-13). In another paper entitled The Crisis of the 1980s, the CPD
asserts that the increasing expansion of the Soviet military presence that the CPD had documented
gained accelerated momentum by the events in the Persian Gulf. It continues that taking control
over the Persian Gulf is part of a much larger and ominous Soviet military presence all around the
world from Africa to Asia. In its publication entitled Alerting America, the CPD expresses its
concern about the Persian Gulf situation, “arguing among other things that the Soviets were
responsible in part for the overthrow of the Shah. The violence of social and religious protest of
the last few years in Iran were actively promoted by the Soviet Union from the beginning Further
at this point there is a real danger of the USSR seizing control of Iran and hence the whole Gulf
area and the West's oil supplies, which “would expose the non-Communist world to the danger of
strangulation" (CPD 1984, 172) According to Paul Nitze in this report, “[b]y achieving dominance
over the Middle East, [the Soviets] aim to outflank Europe. They propose to outflank the Middle
East by achieving controlling positions in Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq on one side, South and North
Yemen, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Mozambique on the other, and by achieving the neutrality of Turkey
to the north.” (CPD 1984, 160).

US Supreme Court decision. This case recognized corporations as ‘persons’, establishing that they had the same
‘rights’ as flesh-and-blood persons under the US Constitution and Bill of Rights.

In CPD’s account, Iran had become a major threat to the Saudi-led oil flow from the Persian Gulf.
A prominent CPD member and then Secretary of Defense, Casper Weinberger pictures Iran in his
report, entitled Security Arrangement in the Persian Gulf, a vital threat to major American interests
in the Persian Gulf, which are “preventing the spread of Soviet influence in the area or domination
of the region by a hostile Iran; preserving the security and stability of the moderate gulf Arab
states; and maintaining continued access to Gulf oil resources, which are becoming increasingly
more important.” (Weinberger 1987, 20). The challenge that Iran is posing to U.S. interests, he
continues, comes from “Iranian intransigence in ending the [Iran-Iraq] war; Iranian determination
to export its Islamic fundamentalism “from Tehran to Jerusalem”; continued Iranian intimidation
of the smaller Gulf countries, in particular Kuwait, through attacks on shipping and territory;
consistent Iranian support for and use of international terrorism; Iranian preparation to deploy
SILKWORM missiles to threaten non-belligerent shipping and the free flow of oil through the
Strait of Hormuz; and Soviet efforts to exploit regional tensions to increase their military presence
and political stature in the area.” (Weinberger 1987, i-ii).
Weinberger emphasizes that the Iranian threat necessitates more pronounced U.S. military
expansion in the Persian Gulf. American presence is especially necessary, he highlights, to protect
the growing U.S-Persian Gulf investment ties, particularly in energy sector. He states in his report:
“American business interests have long been established in the Gulf region. The ArabianAmerican oil company (ARAMCO) established in the 1930’s in Saudi Arabia began large scale
production after World War II. Similarly, oil production began in Bahrain in 1934, in Kuwait and
Qatar in the 1940’s, and in the United Arab Emirates (then the Trucial States) and Oman in the
1960’s and 70’s. The U.S. and other Western companies played a large role in the development of
these oil systems as well as infrastructure construction and other projects associated with economic
development that grew out of the Gulf's oil earnings… Given our growing economic relationship
with the Gulf nations through trade in oil and non-oil products and services, we have a vital and
unquestionable economic stake in ensuring that we have unimpeded access to and from the Gulf,
both now and in the future.” (Weinberger 1987, 6).
The Iran-Iraq war and the perceived threat it brought upon the Persian Gulf oil reserves helped the
CPD to improve the arms sale component of the transnational investment bloc. As a
complementary action to reflagging Kuwaitis oil tankers in countering the Iranian threat, the CPD
recommended that, the U.S. should increase military assistance to its Arab allies in the region,
starting with Saudi Arabia. In his report, Weinberger made this abundantly clear: “Another critical
element of U.S. deterrent strategy in the region includes helping regional states acquire the
capability to deter, and if necessary, defend themselves against external aggression, specifically
Iranian threats and intimidation. For this reason, the Administration places an extremely high value
on its security assistant relationships, including arms sales, with the moderate Arab gulf states, and
in particular Saudi Arabia… These arms will in no way affect the overall regional military balance
and will have no impact whatsoever on Israel’s security. Recognizing the key role Saudi Arabia
plays in regional security, U.S. willingness to help the Saudis meet their legitimate defense needs
sends a very strong signal, both to our friends and others, of the level of U.S. commitment and
resolve to protect our interests in the region.” (Weinberger 1987, iv).
The narrative of Heritage Foundation and the CPD about the Iranian threat the necessity of
improving security and business ties with the Saudi-led Arab allies was echoed by other

institutions within the policy-planning elite network such as the Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), the Hoover Institution, The National Strategy Information Center
(NSIC), and the like. Like the examined publications, such publications as The United States in
the 1980s (Duignan and Rabushka 1980)- by the Hoover Institution- and United States and the
Persian Gulf: Past Mistakes, Present Needs (Cottrell and Moodie 1984)- by the NSIC- maintained
that the events surrounding the Iranian Revolution magnified the Soviet threat, threatened the
stability of the Persian Gulf and steady oil flow from it, and necessitated an assertive U.S. military
posture in the region through military assistance to its allies, particularly the Saudis, and stationing
its military bases in the Persian Gulf. In this sense, this policy-planning network is an inseparable
part of the transnational investment bloc that was growing its oi-dollar-military ties to the region
and inflated the Iranian threat as a pretext.

Conclusion
I have examined the contribution of the Iranian crisis of 1979 to the formation of the transnational
investment bloc in U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf. By the late 1970s and the early 1980s,
transnational capital reorganized itself in the political domain in response to the major changes in
the structure of the global economy and foreign policy crises. The Iranian crisis in this period,
including the revolution, the hostage crisis, and the Iran-Iraq war facilitated the shift of the
reorganized business elite structure toward more militarist tendencies. The Iranian crisis was a key
factor in bringing together the leading sectors of transnational capital and the military-industrial
complex (MIC) in their emphasis on the necessity of the expansion of U.S. military and business
ties with Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, thus marking the early
stages of the formation of a transnational capitalist investment bloc in U.S. The examination of
declassified documents from the Carter administration indicates how U.S. foreign policy officials
like Brzezinski, who were embedded in Trilateralist program, showed transparently that the Iran
crisis required a move away from détente and more toward military assertiveness.
The developments in Iran, even before the revolution, brought about a shift in U.S. business-elite
coalition toward Saudi Arabia as a new reliable ally. I showed how the Shah’s insistence on higher
oil prices and his ambitious social and military plans led Iran to lose its position as a true U.S. ally
that would guarantee the stability of oil and financial markets to the Saudis. Saudi Arabia that had
already [since 1974] assumed an important role in financing U.S. debts, became more integrated
into the transnational investment bloc by covering the loss of Iran’s oil production after the
revolution. The perceived threat that the new Iranian regime posed- through its efforts to export
the Islamic Revolution, militia activities, and resistance to ending the war with Iraq- to the stability
of oil and dollar flows from the region, made Saudi Arabi’s role even more significant in the
consolidation of a U.S.-Saudi oil-finance-military complex. This threat was consistently inflated
by a corporate-financed policy-planning elite network- most importantly the CPD and the Heritage
Foundation- that used the Iranian crisis as a pretext for justifying more military expansion in the Persian
Gulf. The developments in Iran very well fit the narrative that this network was advancing
regarding how military preparedness in the Persian Gulf is an answer to all U.S. problems in the
region.
All in all, the Iranian crisis of the late 1970s and the 1980s, empowered a U.S.-business elite
coalition that was forming in U.S. policy toward the Persian Gulf. It situated a powerful cross-

border interest bloc at the core of what I call a “securitization complex” that manufactures an image
of Iran as a threat to U.S. “national security” and “national interests.” Due to its mutual geostrategic
and geopolitical interests with U.S. geopolitics planners- as well as being embedded within that
apparatus- in isolating Iran, this transnational investment bloc has played a major role in defining
Iran as an essential component of the U.S. strategic threat definition in the Persian Gulf. To counter
this threat, this bloc has promoted more U.S. military involvement with the Persian Gulf as well
as military fortification of U.S. allies, particularly Saudi Arabia. These securitization efforts have
dramatically increased over the decades as more and more sectors of transnational capital have
been integrated into and expanded the hegemonic transnational investment bloc. Perpetuating and
institutionalizing the anti-Iran narrative would not have been possible without the financial support
of corporate advocacy groups and a powerful bloc of business interests that draws profit from antiIran and pro-Saudi polices.26 The fact that all Iranian attempts for rapprochement have failed
throughout these decades speaks to the political and economic power of the anti-Iran conversation
that has grown steadily. The last concerted effort of this bloc against Iran was to scuttle the 2015
Iran nuclear deal which was successful when President Trump withdrew from the agreement in
2018. The examination of the bloc’s role in formulating this decision is a matter to be discussed in
another research.
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